Written from 97 named sources · Oct 27 · first result Can the ACC Afford to Compete? ACC Football Money, Spending, and Results Snapshot date: October 26, 2026 Research standard: Investigative college-sports finance Classification: Disclosed Reported Modeled NR (not reported; never treated as zero) Summary Two questions frame this report. First: can the ACC’s 17 football-playing members compete financially with the Big Ten and the SEC from shared conference money? Second: inside the ACC, does roster spending predict who is winning? Not from conference distributions alone. Fiscal 2025 (July 1, 2024–June 30, 2025) was the last full operating year before schools could pay athletes directly. The ACC reported $826.5 million in conference revenue. The Big Ten reported $1.47 billion. The SEC reported $1.11 billion [5][7][17][34]. Longtime Big Ten members received a minimum of $76 million. Longtime SEC members received a minimum of $70.3 million. Longtime ACC members received a minimum of $42.8 million [5][34]. The holdover-floor gaps are: ACC floor versus Big Ten floor: $42.8M − $76.0M = −$33.2 million per school. Ratio: $42.8 / $76.0 = 0.563, or 56.3% of the Big Ten floor (a 43.7% shortfall). ACC floor versus SEC floor: $42.8M − $70.3M = −$27.5 million per school. Ratio: $42.8 / $70.3 = 0.609, or 60.9% of the SEC floor (a 39.1% shortfall). Those gaps are Reported conference payouts, not total athletic budgets. Tickets, gifts, sponsorships, student fees and campus support still fund most of a public ACC department, as Georgia Tech’s FY25 audit shows. They do not close the shared-media hole by themselves. Direct institutional revenue sharing began on July 1, 2025, after final approval of the House v. NCAA settlement on June 6, 2025 [9][12]. The 2025–26 cap is $20.5 million per school [9][12][15]. That figure is 47.9% of the ACC’s $42.8 million floor ($20.5 / $42.8) and 27.0% of the Big Ten’s $76 million floor ($20.5 / $76.0). Those percentages are Calculated. They do not mean the cap is paid out of the conference check; they show how large the new payroll is relative to the check. Spending is not a straight predictor of ACC results. Modeled 2026–27 football roster costs from nil-ncaa.com put Miami first at $38.6 million and Boston College last at $18.8 million [88]. As of games through October 24, 2026, Miami is 7–0, 5–0 ACC, No. 1 in the AP poll [8][24]. Wake Forest, 16th in that modeled ranking at $20.0 million, is 6–1, 4–1 ACC, No. 14. SMU, which received a reduced FY25 conference distribution and no media-rights share at the start of membership, is 6–1, 4–1 ACC, No. 19 [5][8][24][34][88]. Florida State ranks third in the same model at $26.4 million and is 3–4, 1–3 ACC, unranked, with a contractual buyout in the mid-eight figures if the school fires Mike Norvell without cause [24][36][88][90]. The rest of this report shows the arithmetic, labels every figure, and marks what is still NR. Methods note Snapshot. Standings, AP rankings, coaching status, contracts and legislation are frozen as of October 26, 2026. Games through Saturday, October 24, 2026, are included. Scope. All 17 ACC football programs: Boston College, California, Clemson, Duke, Florida State, Georgia Tech, Louisville, Miami, NC State, North Carolina, Pittsburgh, SMU, Stanford, Syracuse, Virginia, Virginia Tech and Wake Forest. Notre Dame is an ACC member in other sports and an FBS independent in football. Notre Dame is omitted from team tables. Conference revenue totals include Notre Dame where tax filings do. Labels. Disclosed = school, conference or government record. Reported = news outlet. Modeled = tracker estimate (nil-ncaa.com, Baratelli Institute). NR = not in the public record used here. NR is not zero. Conflicts. Competing figures are shown side by side with outlet and date. They are not averaged. Single-source flag. USA Today and Sports Illustrated reprint the same tax-return analysis for several conference floors; that is one lineage, not two independent counts [5][34]. On3 is the single source for Norvell’s year-by-year buyout schedule [36]. No correlation statistics. Spending-versus-results comparisons use ranks, records and plain-language gaps only. Buyouts. Amounts are owed if fired without cause, not amounts already paid, unless a firing has occurred. Schedules that change with the calendar are printed in full. Part 1 — The conference money gap Table 1.1. FY2025 Power conference revenue and distributions Fiscal year 2025: July 1, 2024–June 30, 2025. Conference IRS Form 990 filings released in 2026. Conference Total FY25 revenue Minimum to longtime full-share member Average to full-share members Top earner Reduced-share members (FY25) Big Ten (18) $1.47 billion Disclosed [5][7] $76.0 million minimum, Reported [5][34] $79.9 million Reported [7] Ohio State $91.6 million Reported [5][7][34] Oregon $48.4 million; Washington $46.7 million Reported [7]. Transition terms beyond those amounts: NR in primary filings reviewed here. SEC (16) $1.11 billion Disclosed [5][34] $70.3 million minimum, Reported [5][34] $72.4 million Reported [7] Georgia $74.5 million Reported [5][34] Texas $12.1 million; Oklahoma $2.6 million Reported [5][34] (transition bowl/CFP/NCAA units). ACC (18 members in the filing, including Notre Dame; 14 full-share football schools) $826.5 million Disclosed [5][17][34] $42.8 million minimum, Reported [5][34] $47.1 million Reported (full-share members) Clemson $55.1 million Reported [5][34] Notre Dame, California, Stanford and SMU: $17 million to $23 million each, Reported range [5][34]. SMU $17.0 million is the only newcomer with a published point figure in that coverage. Per-school amounts for Cal and Stanford inside the range: NR. Single-source flag. The $76.0 million, $70.3 million and $42.8 million floors are from USA Today’s reading of the filings; SI reprints the same analysis [5][34]. Do not treat revenue ÷ members as a payout. $1.47B / 18 = $81.7 million, $1.11B / 16 = $69.4 million, $826.5M / 18 = $45.9 million. Those are Modeled revenue-per-member figures, not distributions. The Big Ten’s own reporting of dollars actually sent to campuses is a different series [7][13]. Gap mathematics 1. Holdover minimum versus holdover minimum ACC vs. Big Ten floor: \[ 42.8 - 76.0 = -33.2 \text{ million dollars per school} \] \[ 42.8 / 76.0 = 0.563 \Rightarrow 56.3\% \text{ of the Big Ten floor (43.7\% shortfall)} \] ACC vs. SEC floor: \[ 42.8 - 70.3 = -27.5 \text{ million dollars per school} \] \[ 42.8 / 70.3 = 0.609 \Rightarrow 60.9\% \text{ of the SEC floor (39.1\% shortfall)} \] 2. Full-share average versus full-share average ACC vs. Big Ten average: \[ 47.1 - 79.9 = -32.8 \text{ million dollars per school} \] \[ 47.1 / 79.9 = 0.589 \Rightarrow 58.9\% \text{ of the Big Ten average (41.1\% shortfall)} \] ACC vs. SEC average: \[ 47.1 - 72.4 = -25.3 \text{ million dollars per school} \] \[ 47.1 / 72.4 = 0.651 \Rightarrow 65.1\% \text{ of the SEC average (34.9\% shortfall)} \] 3. Why an ACC average versus a Big Ten minimum understates the gap \[ 47.1 - 76.0 = -28.9 \text{ million} \] That −$28.9 million comparison mixes an ACC average with a Big Ten floor. Ohio State’s $91.6 million versus the ACC average is $47.1 − $91.6 = −$44.5 million. Versus the ACC floor: $42.8 − $91.6 = −$48.8 million [5][7]. 4. ACC top earner versus Big Ten floor Clemson $55.1 million versus Big Ten minimum $76.0 million: \[ 55.1 - 76.0 = -20.9 \text{ million} \] \[ 55.1 / 76.0 = 0.725 \Rightarrow 72.5\% \text{ of the Big Ten floor} \] Even the ACC’s highest FY25 check trailed the lowest longtime Big Ten check by $20.9 million [5][34]. 5. Reduced-share newcomers Big Ten: Oregon $48.4 million, Washington $46.7 million [7]. Claims that those terms run “through 2030” are NR in the tax-return coverage used here. SEC: Texas $12.1 million, Oklahoma $2.6 million [5][34]. ACC: USA Today and SI place Notre Dame, Cal, Stanford and SMU in a $17–23 million band [5][34]. Assigning $19.9 million to Cal and $19.9 million to Stanford as individual payouts is incorrect; that figure, where reported, is an average across reduced-share newcomers, not each school’s check. SMU’s published point figure is $17.0 million. Cal and Stanford per-school amounts remain NR inside the $17–23 million range. SMU took no conference television media-rights money at the start of membership [5][34]. A nine-year duration for that concession is NR in the filings and national tax-return stories cited here. Local revenue still matters: Georgia Tech FY25 Conference checks are one line, not the whole department. Georgia Tech Athletic Association’s FY25 audited operating revenues totaled $187,096,223 (Disclosed). Line items: Line FY25 amount (Disclosed) Share of operating revenue Contributions and gifts $78,598,932 42.01% ACC conference distributions $49,384,735 26.40% Ticket sales (football $12.29M; men’s basketball $1.73M; other $1.27M) $15,294,542 8.17% Sponsorships and multimedia rights $9,938,436 5.31% Premium seat licenses $9,674,769 5.17% Direct institutional support $9,181,989 4.91% Student athletic fees $6,947,958 3.71% Game guarantees $3,130,315 1.67% Other miscellaneous operating $4,944,547 2.64% Total operating revenues $187,096,223 100.00% ACC distributions were 26.40% of GTAA operating revenue ($49,384,735 / $187,096,223). The other 73.60% is not all “local cash”: a large share is campaign pledges and gifts. The audit date on the statements is September 16, 2025. Next Form 990 cycle. FY25 filings appeared in 2026: SEC in February, Big Ten released about May 1 (ProPublica shows a April 30, 2026 file date) [5][84], ACC on May 22 [5]. FY26 conference returns (year ending June 30, 2026) should follow a similar spring window in 2027. A single “May 2027” date is Modeled, not a disclosed filing deadline. What Table 1.1 shows. The ACC’s shared pool is smaller than the Big Ten’s and the SEC’s by hundreds of millions of dollars. Every full-share ACC football school started the revenue-sharing era more than $27 million behind the SEC floor and more than $33 million behind the Big Ten floor on the conference check alone. Part 2 — The timing Table 2.1. House settlement dates and caps Milestone Date / figure Label Settlement framework (back-pay plus injunctive relief) Back-pay reported as $2.77 billion, $2.78 billion, or $2.8 billion depending on outlet [9][12][15] Reported (range) Final judicial approval June 6, 2025 [9][12] Reported Direct school-to-athlete revenue sharing begins July 1, 2025 [9][12] Reported 2025–26 cap $20.5 million per school (~22% of average Power 5 media, ticket and sponsorship revenue) [9][12][15] Reported / settlement term 2026–27 cap — figure A $21.3 million (~3.9% above $20.5M) [14] Reported estimate; superseded projection 2026–27 cap — figure B $21.32 million ($20.5M × 1.04) [9] Reported (contractual 4% escalator) 2026–27 cap — figure C $21.58 million [42][86] Reported (College Sports Commission / 2026–27 operating figure in later coverage) Do not blend the 2026–27 caps. A 4% step from $20.5 million is $21.32 million. Adding a published $131,438 audit adjustment to that 4% step yields about $21.45 million, which does not equal $21.58 million. This report prints each figure with its source and does not invent a reconciliation. Cap versus FY25 floors (Calculated, not a cash-flow identity): \[ 20.5 / 76.0 = 0.270 \Rightarrow 27.0\% \text{ of the Big Ten minimum} \] \[ 20.5 / 42.8 = 0.479 \Rightarrow 47.9\% \text{ of the ACC minimum} \] FY25 distributions describe where each league stood the day before schools were allowed to write institutional payroll checks to athletes. What Table 2.1 shows. The new cost landed on July 1, 2025. Big Ten and SEC floors can cover a $20.5 million cap and still leave a surplus relative to the ACC floor. An ACC holdover covering the same cap from the conference check alone would be using nearly half of that check. Part 3 — 2026 roster spending (Modeled) Private universities are not under public-records laws. Public universities often withhold athlete-pay detail. Conference-wide football payrolls are therefore Modeled. Table 3.1. Modeled 2026–27 ACC football roster cost (nil-ncaa.com) Source: nil-ncaa.com ACC page, Patrick O’Rourke, CPA [88]. All rows Modeled unless a cell says otherwise. Direct-share column is the model’s uniform $15.6 million assumption, not a disclosure. Rank Program Total modeled roster cost Direct school revenue share (model) Third-party NIL (model residual) Notes 1 Miami $38,629,000 $15,600,000 $23,029,000 Baratelli survey band $44–50M (midpoint $47.0M) [42] 2 Clemson $27,786,000 $15,600,000 $12,186,000 Baratelli band $29–32M (midpoint $30.5M) [42] 3 Florida State $26,391,000 $15,600,000 $10,791,000 Baratelli band $23–30M (midpoint $26.5M) [42] 4 SMU $22,044,000 $15,600,000 $6,444,000 Private; donor-funded NIL is Modeled 5 Virginia Tech $21,908,000 $15,600,000 $6,308,000 $2,000 above Louisville 6 Louisville $21,906,000 $15,600,000 $6,306,000 7 North Carolina $21,876,000 $15,600,000 in model; $13,000,000 Disclosed for 2025–26 football [92][94] $6,276,000 in model Year mismatch: model is 2026–27; disclosure is 2025–26 8 Georgia Tech $21,750,000 $15,600,000 $6,150,000 9 Pittsburgh $21,240,000 $15,600,000 $5,640,000 Conference median in this table 10 Virginia $21,084,000 $15,600,000 $5,484,000 11 Duke $20,492,000 $15,600,000 $4,892,000 12 NC State $20,456,000 $15,600,000 in model; $13,500,000 Disclosed for 2025–26 football [92] $4,856,000 in model Year mismatch, same as UNC 13 California $20,378,000 $15,600,000 $4,778,000 $54,000 above Stanford 14 Stanford $20,324,000 $15,600,000 $4,724,000 Private; payroll NR in public records 15 Syracuse $20,074,000 $15,600,000 $4,474,000 16 Wake Forest $20,022,000 $15,600,000 $4,422,000 17 Boston College $18,797,000 $15,600,000 $3,197,000 Baratelli band $8–13M (midpoint $10.5M) [42] — conflict with nil-ncaa Model mechanics. nil-ncaa holds every ACC school at $15.6 million of direct football revenue share and attributes the rest to third-party NIL [88]. $15.6 million is 76.1% of the $20.5 million 2025–26 cap ($15.6 / 20.5) and 72.3% of a $21.58 million 2026–27 cap ($15.6 / 21.58). It is not 75% of either cap. It is an assumption. Conflicts with disclosed 2025–26 splits (different academic year than the model): UNC football $13.0 million disclosed versus $15.6 million modeled: overstatement of $2.6 million if the 2025–26 split were applied to the 2026–27 model [88][92]. NC State football $13.5 million disclosed versus $15.6 million modeled: overstatement of $2.1 million on the same apples-to-oranges basis [88][92]. Clusters that make rank order weak. Ranks 5–8 (Virginia Tech through Georgia Tech) span $158,000 ($21.908M to $21.750M), a 0.7% spread, and the model holds direct pay constant, so the spread is almost entirely modeled NIL. Ranks 11–16 span $470,000 (2.3%). Those orderings are not meaningful. Baratelli versus nil-ncaa. Thirteen ACC rows on Baratelli’s payroll page copy the nil-ncaa point estimates [42][88]. They are not independent. Miami, Clemson, Florida State and Boston College have separate survey bands; Boston College is the widest disagreement. What Table 3.1 shows. Miami is an outlier at the top. Fifteen of 17 schools sit between about $20 million and $28 million. The ranking is a model, not a payroll register. Part 4 — 2026 results versus spending Table 4.1. Records and AP rank as of October 26, 2026, versus modeled spending rank Games through October 24, 2026. Records Reported from conference and national standings [8][24][26]. Spending rank from Table 3.1 (Modeled). Efficiency = spending rank minus conference standing (positive = better standing than spend rank). Program ACC Overall ACC place AP (Oct. 25–26) Spend rank Efficiency ACC games this season Miami 5–0 7–0 1 No. 1 [24] 1 0 8 SMU 4–1 6–1 T-2 No. 19 [24] 4 +2 8 Wake Forest 4–1 6–1 T-2 No. 14 [24] 16 +14 8 Virginia Tech 3–2 6–2 T-4 NR (1 receiving vote) [24] 5 +1 8 Louisville 3–2 4–3 T-4 NR 6 +2 8 Duke 2–2 5–2 T-6 NR 11 +5 8 Boston College 2–2 4–3 T-6 NR 17 +11 8 Clemson 2–2 4–3 T-6 NR 2 −4 8 North Carolina 2–2 4–3 T-6 NR 7 +1 8 Pittsburgh 2–3 5–3 T-10 NR 9 −1 8 Stanford 2–3 4–4 T-10 NR 14 +4 8 Virginia 2–3 4–4 T-10 NR 10 0 9 (Week 0) California 2–3 3–5 T-10 NR 13 +3 8 Florida State 1–3 3–4 T-14 NR 3 −11 8 NC State 1–3 3–4 T-14 NR 12 −2 9 (Week 0) Georgia Tech 1–3 2–5 T-14 NR 8 −6 8 Syracuse 1–4 3–4 17 NR 15 −2 8 Schedule. NC State played Virginia in Week 0 on August 29, 2026 (Virginia 34–8). Those two play nine ACC games; the other 15 play eight [47]. Largest 2026 overperformers (plain language): Wake Forest (spend rank 16, tied for second) and Boston College (spend rank 17, tied for sixth). Largest 2026 underperformer: Florida State (spend rank 3, tied for 14th). Table 4.2. Final 2025 records versus 2026 spending rank (proxy) 2025 records are final, including bowls [1]. Duke 27, Virginia 20 in overtime, December 6, 2025, ACC Championship [1][2][3][4]. 2026 spending rank is a proxy because a complete 2025 roster-cost table is NR. Program 2025 ACC 2025 overall (final) 2025 postseason 2026 spend rank (proxy) 2025 standing vs. proxy spend Duke 6–2 9–5 Won ACC title (27–20 OT vs. Virginia) [4] 11 Well above spend rank Virginia 7–1 11–3 Regular-season champion; title-game runner-up; Gator Bowl win [1] 10 Well above spend rank Miami 6–2 13–3 CFP participant [1] 1 Near parity Georgia Tech 6–2 9–4 Bowl 8 Above SMU 6–2 9–4 Bowl 4 Near parity Pittsburgh 6–2 8–5 Bowl 9 Above Louisville 4–4 9–4 Bowl 6 Near parity Wake Forest 4–4 9–4 Duke’s Mayo Bowl win vs. Mississippi State 16 Well above NC State 4–4 8–5 Bowl 12 Slightly above California 4–4 7–6 Bowl 13 Slightly above Clemson 4–4 7–6 Bowl 2 Well below Stanford 3–5 4–8 No bowl 14 Near parity Florida State 2–6 5–7 No bowl 3 Well below Virginia Tech 2–6 3–9 No bowl 5 Well below North Carolina 2–6 4–8 No bowl 7 Below Boston College 1–7 2–10 No bowl 17 Near parity Syracuse 1–7 3–9 No bowl 15 Near parity Pre-bowl records of Duke 8–5 and Virginia 10–3 describe the championship-game participants that night; they are not season-final records [3][4]. What the two tables show. High spending can coincide with a No. 1 team (Miami) and with a bottom-quartile record (Florida State). Low spending can coincide with a top-three league start (Wake Forest) and with a championship (Duke in 2025). Money is not irrelevant. It is not a ranking of the standings. Part 5 — Case studies: Wake Forest, Florida State and SMU Table 5.1. Three-program comparison Metric Wake Forest Florida State SMU 2025 final record 9–4 (4–4 ACC); Mayo Bowl win vs. Mississippi State; fourth nine-win season in program history [48] 5–7 (2–6 ACC); no bowl 9–4 (6–2 ACC) [1] 2026 preseason media poll 13th (1,103 points) Reported 11th (1,439 points, 3 first-place votes) Reported 2nd (2,794 points, 6 first-place votes) Reported 2026 record (Oct. 26) 6–1, 4–1 ACC, AP No. 14 [24] 3–4, 1–3 ACC, unranked [24][90] 6–1, 4–1 ACC, AP No. 19 [24] 2026 losses Sept. 18 vs. then-No. 5 Miami, 20–33 (sole loss) [26][39] Sept. 7 vs. SMU 24–27; Sept. 19 at Alabama 36–50; Oct. 9 at Louisville 20–44 [90]; Oct. 17 at Miami Sept. 19 at Louisville, 31–41 (sole loss) Head coach pay Jake Dickert: private school, NR after the Dec. 2, 2025 extension [49]. 2025 USA Today/SDS list: $4.8 million [10]. Other outlets have used ~$3.5 million. Figures are not averaged. Mike Norvell: $10.3 million in 2026, then +$150,000 a year to $11.05 million in 2031 [90] Rhett Lashlee: private school, NR on current terms. 2025 SDS list: $2,470,818 [10] FY25 ACC distribution $42.8 million minimum full share [5][34] $42.8 million minimum full share [5][34] $17.0 million in the $17–23 million reduced-share band; no TV media-rights share at the start of membership [5][34] 2025 preseason poll placements for these three teams are NR in the sources used for this report and are omitted. Wake Forest Jake Dickert’s first season (2025) ended 9–4 with a bowl win over an SEC opponent [48]. Athletic director John Currie announced a long-term extension on December 2, 2025 [49]. Annual pay after that extension is NR (private university). Picked 13th in 2026, Wake Forest is 6–1 with its only loss to No. 1 Miami. Florida State Since the start of 2024, Florida State is 10–21 overall and 4–16 in ACC play (2–10 in 2024, 5–7 in 2025, 3–4 through Oct. 24, 2026). Contract formula (Reported): without-cause buyout equals 85% of remaining base and supplemental salary, with a duty to mitigate [36][90]. Table 5.2. Mike Norvell without-cause buyout schedule (owed if fired, not paid) If terminated On3 (Pete Nakos) [36] Tallahassee Democrat / USA TODAY Network (Dan Rorabaugh, Oct. 9, 2026) [90] Heavy [55] During 2026 / before Dec. 1, 2026 About $51 million $47.7 million after the Oct. 3 Virginia game; about $46.5 million if fired on Dec. 1 $46.7 million before Dec. 1 After the 2026 season $45.6 million $45.6 million if fired at season’s end [91] — After 2027 $36.8 million — — After 2028 $27.7 million — — After 2029 $18.5 million — — After 2030 $9.3 million — — Contract end Dec. 31, 2031 Dec. 31, 2031 — On3 is the single source for the 2027–2030 steps. USA Today Network figures for mid-season 2026 are one corporate lineage. A claim that the post-2026 buyout is paid at $800,000 a month through 2031 does not match $45.6 million (60 × $0.8 million = $48 million) and is not used here. Staff. Tim Harris Jr. is the offensive coordinator as of the Oct. 9, 2026 contract coverage [90]. Older totals that named Gus Malzahn as OC and summed a $61.57 million staff buyout as of October 2025 are stale and are not current. On3 has estimated a full coaching transition (head coach, staff, next hire) near $100 million [36] — Reported, single source. Leadership. President Richard McCullough fired athletic director Michael Alford without cause on September 14, 2026. Senior associate AD Bruce Warwick is interim AD during a national search [37][57][59]. McCullough said that day: “Florida State is committed to maintaining the highest standards for our student-athletes and staff. We want all of them to be able to play for championships. This leadership change reflects that commitment.” [59] Debt. Public NCAA-related filings put FSU athletics-related debt at $437 million at the close of FY25, tied largely to revenue bonds for a $265 million Doak Campbell Stadium renovation and a $138 million Dunlap Football Center [37][90][91]. Facility-project totals in other stories run more than $400 million to more than $500 million; those are separate Reported figures, not the same as the $437 million debt stock [59][91]. SMU FY25 ACC money: $17.0 million inside the $17–23 million reduced-share band [5][34]. The school took no conference TV media-rights distribution at the start of membership. Exact remaining years on that concession: NR in the tax-return stories. On the field as of October 26, 2026: 6–1, 4–1, AP No. 19, ahead of 13 full-share league members in the standings [24]. Part 6 — Coaching changes and buyouts Table 6.1. ACC head-coaching terminations, 2025 through October 26, 2026 School / coach Date and context Buyout (conflicting figures shown, not averaged) Offsets / who pays Successor Buyout vs. modeled 2026 roster cost (comparison of a contract figure to a model) NC State — Dave Doeren Oct. 24, 2026, after 31–28 loss at Stanford; team 3–4, 1–3 ACC [60] ESPN: $10.3 million. USA TODAY (Fayetteville Observer): $9.75 million for remaining years if fired without cause before Jan. 1. Pack Insider reading of the April 25, 2024 contract: $9,751,098 (2027–29 base) + $605,548 (rest of 2026) = $10,356,646 [60]. Dec. 1, 2025 USA Today database figure $13,129,456 is a pre-firing snapshot, not this bill [10]. Duty-to-mitigate / new-job offset in contract reporting [60]. Claim that the Wolfpack Club is the payor: NR. Todd Goebbel, interim. Contract NR [60]. $9.75M / $20.456M = 47.7%; $10.3M / $20.456M = 50.4% of modeled roster cost [88]. Virginia Tech — Brent Pry Sept. 14, 20